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Will The Madness Never End?

Am I the only one out there who's sick and tired of all the speculation about Yahoo and Microsoft?



Will Steve and Jerry tie the knot? Is Rupert going to swoop in and rescue the fair maiden? Or is Jerry destined for the arms of another, like say AOL, or Google?

Who cares, really? Yahoo shareholders ought to. Take the money and run, that is. No matter how much "synergy" there is, or how much sense this makes strategically (for either party), these things typically work out only one way--value gets destroyed, and some upstart comes in and disrupts the big guys.

Oh, they'll hang around for awhile, sheer weight will see to that. But in a couple of years the market for search and advertising will look completely different than it does today--and neither Yahoo or Microsoft will be at the top. So why bother?

Let's just get this over with one way or another, and go back to our regularly scheduled useless tug-of-war: Hillary and Barack.

Ride The Wave

Dan Rayburn has another nice article out this morning, this one detailing his recent visit to Akamai Technologies (NASDAQ: AKAM). It's generally very positive about the company, and given Dan's readership, I wouldn't be surprised to see a nice bump in the stock today, all other things being equal.

In past discussions with Akamai, management has hinted to me that most of the analysts covering the stock don't completely "get" its business model and in particular, its sustainable advantages. To do so requires a fair amount of technical acumen, and so I'm not surprised.

I do not see Akamai being disrupted in the short-term. Dan does a nice job in his piece of dispelling the myth of a CDN price war that has kept a lid on its stock price over the past couple of quarters. Certainly others such as Limelight Networks (NASDAQ: LLNW) and Level3 (NASDAQ: LVLT) can deliver content more cheaply, but not at the service levels many clients require. Really, it's in the [delivery x service] product where Akamai shines.

One day, transit bandwidth may be an order of magnitude cheaper, and everyone will have 100 Mb/s or more of sustained bandwidth entering their homes (I wish). But that time is far off in the future. As long as Shannon's Law holds, and people continue to ramp their media consumption via the internet, there will be a need for the kind of optimizing technology Akamai provides.

In the intermediate term there's nothing I see that would indicate severe headwinds for Akamai. They recently won an intellectual property suit against Limelight, and in general have a solid IP portfolio. They are the market leader, have very high profit margins, and continue to dominate the high end for CDN and application acceleration services, both of which are expected to enjoy double digit growth rates in the coming years.

My view is that they're currently undervalued (though not drastically) and should enjoy steady appreciation for some time.

Pando Bears

Dan Rayburn has a note out this morning about the lack of traction that P2P vendors such as Pando Networks and BitTorrent are experiencing with Content Delivery Networks. Dan's the most knowledgeable guy I've read about CDNs, and I agree with him here. P2P certainly has its commercial uses, but as Dan points out:

From what I can tell in the market, P2P is not as big of a story as it was at the end of last year. The topic has cooled off a bit except when its being discussed as it pertains to carriers blocking or filtering of P2P based traffic on their networks. Aside from that, customers are not asking me about P2P and 55.2% of those we surveyed about their content delivery needs said they did not plan to even look at P2P as a delivery solution for 2008.

Cost is usually touted as the primary reason to use P2P for content delivery, and as I've argued before, this won't scale--ISPs will eventually demand their pound of flesh, one way or another. Plus, as Dan says over and over, cost isn't even the most important factor for most content providers. My view is that P2P will eventually take its place as a valuable niche method for video delivery, and several of the larger players will gain traction (and/or be acquired). But it's likely to remain a total delivery solution only for file traders and small content owners.

Don't Bug Me

Michael Learmonth over at Silicon Alley comments on a NY Times article about how NBC is seeking to get advertisers to sponsor entire shows, as they did in the early days of television. It's an attempt to help bypass the impact of TiVo-like ad skipping.

While the expectation is that sponsors will have some input into the show, I think the ultimate model is a bit less.... participative.

Expect to see TV shows broadcast with corporate logo "bugs" included. You know, those little icons in the bottom corner of the screen that are somewhat intrusive but usually bad only when they cover something you want to see. One or more sponsors could purchase a certain amount of bug time during the show. It might not stop piracy, but it would mean TiVo viewers can't completely avoid the messaging.

What's more, with the advertisement now firmly attached to the video--sort of a cross between a product placement and an ad--the networks may be able to grab more coin from sponsors, as the ad would travel with the video wherever it was syndicated (cable, TV, web, even reruns).

MacroStar: Vision or Hallucination?

This morning Macrovision (MVSN) reported it has completed the divestiture of its software business, including the FLEXnet and InstallShield product lines, raising $200M. With the previously announced sale of its games unit to RealNetworks (RNWK), Macrovision is well on its way to completely transforming its business. What remains is to consummate the merger with Gemstar/TV Guide (GMST).

The company believes that with the cash raised from these recent sales, it has reduced the amount of debt needed to finance the Gemstar purchase by nearly 20%, to just $650M. Expect to see a good portion of this remaining debt retired early, as Macrovision spins off non-strategic portions of Gemstar once it's folded in--notably the TV Guide print business, which I believe is orthogonal to MVSN's core strategy. This could significantly shorten the loan payback on the purchase from the 2011 date CFO James Budge originally estimated.

That all assumes, of course, that the deal goes through. Many Gemstar shareholders were none too happy when the merger was first announced in December. Ditto many Macrovision investors, who either did not understand or did not believe the vision management articulated. I would argue Budge and CEO Fred Amoroso did a poor job of explaining it at the time, using lots of effusive, scripted prose but leaving behind what felt like a distinctive snake oil residue.

However, there is a method in the madness here, a bit more visible now that extraneous bits have been spun out. The key is to understand Macrovision's three key constituencies: Hollywood studios, consumer electronics manufacturers, and cable companies (MSOs). Traditionally, the studios paid for copy protection, manufacturers licensed the tech for VCRs and DVD players, and MSOs paid to ensure compatibility between studio copy protection and their headend gear. Great high-margin cash business. All good.

But a year or so ago, Macrovision acquired Mediabolic, which gives it technology to enable (copy-protected) video transfer between PCs and multiple devices within the home. Say, to cable set-top boxes. They have already signed Scientific Atlanta (CSCO) as a customer, and I believe either Motorola or NDS is also on board.

Next, they bought All Media Guide, which provides metadata for video and music. By acquiring Gemstar, Macrovision gains television guide info--again, metadata. MVSN can now license both algorithms and information to device manufacturers and cable companies, while helping Hollywood protect its content wherever it is transferred. In the bargain, consumers would get a seamless home video capability.

Your existing set-top box becomes a media hub. Can you say "AppleTV"? I knew you could.

Arguably, Macrovision has made some missteps with its strategy in the past. The software business had low margins relative to MVSN's licensing unit, and games was pretty much a bust. But unlike many firms, it has been fairly quick to recognize errors and dispose of losing businesses. And this vision, however poorly spelled out by management, feels right.

Based on April 1 closing prices, and assuming no change in the original terms, the Gemstar deal is now valued at about $2.22B, 21% below the original $2.8B figure but slightly above the current market cap. This compares to a 9% drop in the S&P500 over the same period, and largely reflects the poor reaction of traders to both sides of the deal. The SEC just declared the S-4 effective and proxies are being mailed out. As both boards are already signed up (including Rupert Murdoch, with 41% ownership), it looks like the merger will go through.

Given the margin expansion that will follow the spin out of the poorer performing Software and Games units, Macrovision may be somewhat undervalued, even allowing for the anticipated share dilution. But for Gemstar investors who believe this vision could become reality, there's substantial upside post-merger if the firm can execute properly.

Disclosure: Author holds no positions in either Macrovision or Gemstar.